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This  paper  explores  the  deterioration  of  the  strategic  alliance  between 
commercial  farmers  and  the  state  in  Zimbabwe  after  1990.
2    Expiry  of  the 
Lancaster  House  constitution,  the  implementation  of  a  structural  adjustment 
program and the formal emergence of a black ‘empowerment’ lobby combined 
with  severe  drought  had  significantly  altered  the  nature  of  Zimbabwe’s  land 
debate by the mid 1990s.  The deadlock in land redistribution during this period 
is often vaguely attributed to a combination of state apathy and white farmer 
resistance, but interest group dynamics were far more complex both internally 
and externally.  This comprehensive analysis of the relative policies, positions 
and internal reconfigurations of key stakeholders explains the polarisation of the 
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“The CFU understands and accepts the need for land reform.  Such 
reform should, however be implemented in a manner that ensures 
land is used on a sustainable productive basis…”   




“…time is of the essence and we cannot dissipate this precious 
commodity by haggling over the peripheral issues of the land 
question… it seems that we are not being understood… the land 
question is a time bomb which must be diffused right now”  
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1.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
White farmers played an important pro-active role during the negotiations that led to successful 
political settlement in the 1970s.  This is at odds with their perceived intransigence towards 
reform during the 1990s.  Similarly, the pragmatism of ZANU PF at Independence was 
seemingly abandoned with the introduction of compulsory land acquisitions through the 1992 
LAA.  These hardening stances raise intriguing questions, especially because compromises were 
available to both interest groups.   Land market interventions by government may have avoided 
the controversies and indirect costs of compulsory acquisition. Likewise, farmers could have 
promoted these market interventions, particularly land taxes, and encouraged further financial 
support from Britain. These are the questions at the heart of this paper and at the centre of the 
growing strains on the relationship between white farmers and the state in the 1990s.  
 
The paper is structured in three sections.  Firstly, I discuss the reconfiguration of the land debate 
and its interaction with emerging black economic interests. Secondly, I explore the impact of 
structural adjustment and the 1992 drought on Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector and the land 
question.  Finally, I analyse the communication breakdown between the CFU and the 
government during and after the passage of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act.   
 
1.2  RECONFIGURING THE LAND DEBATE IN THE 1990s 
 
1.2.1  The Re-Emergence of the Land Question 
 
During and after the 1987 Unity Accord, the consolidation of a centralised, bureaucratic and 
technocratic administration partially obscured an extension of the ruling party’s power within 
and outside the civil service.  Ideological incompatibilities between the party and the 
bureaucratic state were increasingly exhibited in contradictions between technocratic agrarian 
policies and more radical populist calls for extensive land reform.  Compared to the relationship 
between white farmers and the state in the 1980s, communications in the 1990s deteriorated 
markedly.   Farmers misjudged the political debate,   partly due to assumptions about their 
‘indispensability’, and partly due to an inundation of land and race rhetoric at election times.  
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Joshua Nkomo told white farmers at the 1989 CFU congress: “The land question in this country 
sparked a revolution and now threatens to dowse the fires of that revolution and start another – 
this time based on class”.
5  John Brown (CFU President) responded by declaring that it was the 
best government for farmers that the country had ever seen. Later in the year, Nkomo addressed 
a farmers’ meeting in Bulawayo where he was asked for reassurances over property rights.   
When pressed, he lost his temper, smashed a glass of water against the wall, and declared:  
 
Let me make this quite clear.  You whites must make sure that you wear pyjamas to 
bed, because when we chase you out it will be at night and we don’t want you running 
down the streets naked.
6 
 
Most farmers attributed such outbursts to electioneering ahead of the 1990 elections. However 
Nkomo’s re-tabling of the land question catalysed debate at ZANU PF’s 1989 party congress 
where demands for land reform emerged from the black business elites (Moyo 1994: 2).  ZANU 
PF’s land report after the congress reflected these shifts, and was adapted into a National Land 
Policy Document the following year. The fundamental goals were: to source a further 5 million 
hectares to settle another 110 000 families (arrived at by subtracting 52 000 already settled, from 
the 1982 target of 162 000), to introduce price controls on land, to introduce a land tax, to pay 
for land in local dollars rather than foreign currency, to introduce a maximum farm size and the 
principle of one-man one-farm, and to transfer better land (more of regions II and III).   
According to Alexander (1991: 606): 
 
Commercial farmers reacted angrily.  CFU President John Brown commented: ‘in my 
opinion, what is called the New National Land Policy is not yet a policy. It is a number 
of principles, some excellent, some fair and some downright wrong’.  
 
Brown argues that his concerns were justified because of the ‘unrealistic targets’, the 
‘questionable results’ of resettlement to date, and the significant areas of land already acquired 
that were still unsettled.
7   Significant areas of land (3 million hectares) had been secured in the 
first half of 1980s, and government cited four reasons for the slow down during the second half 
of the 1980s: political conflict in Matabeleland; world recession and drought; the scarcity and 
price of land; and insufficient resettlement backup capacity.
8   However, Government spending 
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6 Interview with John Brown, Mt Hampden, January 2004; Interview with Alan Burl, Marondera, March 2004. 
7 Interview with John Brown, Mt Hampden, January 2004. 
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on land diminished significantly during this period and the 1985 Land Acquisition Act, which 
gave government right of first refusal on all land sold, was scarcely used.
 9   Roth (1994a) shows 
that 1800 commercial farms, amounting to more than 1.5 million hectares, were offered to the 
state between the 1985 and 1992 Land Acquisition Acts, of which Government purchased less 
than one-third. Roth argues that the key constraints of the exercise were funding and resettlement 
capacity, rather than the supply or price of land.   He shows that land prices did not increase 
prohibitively in real terms, but that funds allocated for land purchases declined significantly 
(Selby 2006: 135). There was no shortage of land for resettlement in the 1980s. The 1990s were 
different, with a new set of questions, interests and pressures for different types of land from 
existing stakeholders, and from an emerging set of new interest groups.
10    
 
1.2.2  Land and Economic Empowerment  
 
Economic growth during the 1980s, was greatest within white-owned sectors due to established 
advantages in access to resources.  In the 1990s a new black capitalist sector developed and 
promoted an ideology of ‘economic nationalism’.   Some members of the ruling elite had 
accumulated properties throughout the 1980s, and after the Unity Accord competition between 
elites was generally kept within the ruling party structure. However, a younger generation of 
black entrepreneurs became increasingly vocal and looked to the state for economic 
opportunities.  In return, they were used to extend the reach and influence of the ruling party.
11     
 
However, the rhetoric of black economic empowerment, like the rhetoric of liberation and the 
rhetoric of socialism could be adapted and used to strategic political advantage.   This was 
illustrated within the growing ideological support for economic structural adjustments and 
market liberalisation, in which empowerment was both a means and a goal.  In this way 
economic liberalization became linked to economic nationalism (Raftopolous and Moyo, 
1995:17).  
 
Whites were now rare within the public sector, but still dominated the formal private sector, 
particularly in farming, finance and mining, so black empowerment had broad appeal.   CFU 
minutes from 1991 record that “a huge empowerment boom had awakened throughout many 
                                                
9 Alexander (1993: 195) cites the labelling of the 1985 LAA as a ‘paper tiger’. 
10 For a start the population in the communal areas had increased by more than 30 percent in the 1980s. 
11 “Sudden flurry to help Indigenous businessmen” The Sunday Mail, February 3, 1991.  Whereas the Tanzanian 
state had actively discouraged the emergence of a black middle class, ZANU PF co-opted emerging black 
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black sectors”.
12  Empowerment could be promoted through radical reforms or through gradual 
economic linkages. The CFU were aware of these options and their implications. David Hasluck 
(CFU Director) identified a “difference of opinion in the way forward between the radicals and 
the gradualists” and noted that the radical path was incongruent with structural adjustment.
13   
At this stage senior political figures also advocated gradual transition: Joshua Nkomo during 
discussions with the CFU explained that: “we have experienced 100 years of tying knots and … 
[although there is] little change at the moment, 100 years of knot tying [cannot] be undone in 10 
years”.
 14    
 
In 1990, the Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC) was launched in a state-supported 
drive to promote black participation in big business.
15 Qualified black executives were promoted 
ahead of white colleagues and the number of black chartered accountants and lawyers in 
executive roles increased rapidly.
16 This was slow but generally merit-oriented and mediated by 
corporate process and structure.  Within less formal sectors empowerment was promoted through 
unofficial means: the waving of taxes and regulations, selective contract and license allocations 
and relaxed operating guidelines.   For small and medium sized black-owned businesses this 
created advantages against established white competitors.
17   It also allowed the ruling party to 
control the benefits of empowerment, and who they accrued to. Given the dominance of white 
interests over the agricultural sector ten years after independence, it was the most obvious target 
for empowerment reform and the idea of promoting black commercial farmers appealed to many 
members of the elite, who saw opportunities for themselves. 
 
1.2.3  A New Class of Black Farmer 
 
The New National Land Policy distinguished itself from early resettlement by claiming to be the 
second phase of land reform: The 1980s had targeted the destitute, the landless and refugees and 
was focussed on small-scale farming.
18  Plans for the 1990s envisaged a commercial farming 
class as the most desirable beneficiaries, running alongside a continuing program for small scale 
                                                
12 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 29 May 1991: 3. 
13 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 26 June 1991. 
14 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 31 October 1990. 
15 “Big Business and IBDC Urged to Work Together”, The Herald, 13 June 1991. A parliamentary committee on 
Indigenisation was formally established.  Also see Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 26 June 1991. 
16 Discussions with Andrew House, Harare, December 2004. 
17 “Big Business and IBDC Urged to Work Together”, The Herald, 13 June 1991; Interview with Dr David Hatendi, 
Harare, January 2004. 
18 Although, the idea of master farmers as key beneficiaries had been promoted in the 1980s the new focus on 
‘commercial farmers’ on private tenure was a distinctly different angle. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 7 
farmers to be chosen ever more rigorously on grounds of productive potential rather than need.  
Politicians argued that this met the changing expectations of both structural adjustment and 
empowerment.
19 Moyo and Skalnes (1990: 4) noted the shift in government objectives around 
land from the normative and political towards broader economic goals.  However there were 
contradictions in promoting the two systems concurrently and a lack of clarity on how they 
would interact and which would receive priority. 
 
Most land analyses of this period, including those by Moyo (1994; 1995) and Roth (1994), 
understate the differences between potential beneficiaries.  There were three distinct categories:  
land-hungry small-scale producers;  aspiring commercial farmers (often master farmers from 
purchase areas, or people in management positions on commercial farms or graduates of training 
colleges); and lastly, aspiring commercial farmer land lords - the political elite who were more 
likely to use land for status or speculative reasons.  Official policy held that the first two 
categories could be resettled complementarily, and largely denied the existence of the third.
20    
 
The Ministry of Agriculture and technical departments such as Agritex, shifted official 
objectives towards promoting larger-scale black commercial farming.
21 This was based on two 
broad assumptions: firstly, that resettlement to date had been less than successful in increasing 
marketed production; and, secondly, that poverty reduction could only be achieved through 
economic growth, which could only be achieved through increased productivity, which appeared 
to only be possible through ‘proper’ commercial systems. Agriculture Minister Mangwende used 
the impacts of the 1992 drought to justify the policy shift to the CFU, arguing that irrigation and 
commercial production systems had shown their value, whereas communal areas had suffered a 
sharp fall in production.
22 The new direction was also rhetorically conducive with both ESAP 
and ‘empowerment’ - black commercial farmers were expected to benefit from export crops.
23 
While government policy continued to include small scale resettlement,  it received diminishing 
amounts of attention, credibility and resources. 
 
By the early1990s most government officials seemed to hail the political successes but accept the 
economic shortfalls of resettlement.   CFU records claim that “many senior officials and MPs 
                                                
19 Interview with Dr Kumbirai Kangai, Harare, December 2003. 
20 For example, see Moyo (1994: 22). 
21 For example, see the New National Land Policy Paper (GoZ, 1990). 
22 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 26 February 1992 
23 Interview with Dr Robbie Mupawose, Harare, January 2004. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 8 
spoke quite pragmatically about the ‘failures’ of the resettlement program”.
24 During 
parliamentary debate over a commission to examine the results of resettlement, the Minister of 
Agriculture, Mangwende, stated: 
 
Of course we have all accepted that the first phase of resettlement had its shortcomings, 
especially on the settler selection aspect. (It) was meant to address a political reality… we 
had to give them land irrespective of whether they were productive or not.  There was no 
time to plan, select and train these people…the second phase should be a productive one.
25 
 
He insisted that the new program required efficient utilization of land on a sustainable basis and 
that he wanted to see “one hectare in the communal lands produce what one hectare in the 
commercial sector does”, echoing Denis Norman from 1981.
26     There was a growing opinion, 
driven by empowerment, economic-adjustment and productivity arguments that further 
resettlement should be commercially oriented and include larger scale farms.   Minister of Lands 
Sidney Sekeremayi, explained: “the objective of land distribution is not merely to give land to 
the landless masses, but to create an (black) agricultural community on land which will no longer 
be just subsistence but commercial in orientation”.
27  Mangwende, claimed “we are not going to 
give land to everyone including those who were not making use of it in the past, but only to 
those who have the wish, desire, commitment and knowledge of using the land” (Alexander 
1991: 605).  Whilst the emphasis on productivity in resettlement was not new, the commercial 
direction and implied increase in farm sizes was. 
 
For most commercial farmers, the perceived failures of resettlement in the 1980s had as much to 
do with systems of land-tenure, as with the lack of official support.
28  The ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ was perceived by many farmers to be the key flaw to communal production 
techniques, along with the inability to use land as collateral for credit. To many white farmers 
promoting a black commercial farming class was more desirable than what they saw as 
expanding communal areas through small-scale resettlement.  Communal production systems 
were regarded as unproductive, subsistence oriented and inferior during the colonial era, and 
were increasingly perceived in the same way by the black-run administration after independence.   
                                                
24 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting 25 September 1991: Lands and Legislation Appendix. 
25 Extract from Hansard Record of Parliamentary Debate, 11 March 1992.  
26 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 31 October, 1990.   For more information on Norman’s (1986) strategy see 
his Foreword. Norman and Mupawose’s approach was incentive-led. 
27 This was also cited in the National Land Policy Document (Alexander 1993: 186 and 1994: 333).    
28 This perspective was supported in reports by the World Bank (1991) and the Whitsun Foundation (1981) and 
fuelled opinions that land redistribution alone, in its contemporary format, could not solve Zimbabwe’s poverty 
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More fundamentally, this shifted the nature and direction of the land question. Despite politicians 
continuing to play the populist land card, the new focus on ‘productivity’ and on black 
‘capitalist’ farmers threatened to sideline the peasantry and their needs for land redistribution.
29 
It also sought to break-down the dualism of the system, but was immediately affected by the 
impacts of structural adjustment on the land question. 
 
1.3   STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND LAND REFORM 
 
Zimbabwe’s Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) was adopted for two reasons. 
Firstly, an economic crisis had resulted from excessive borrowings and government expenditure 
leading to a balance-of-payments crisis. Secondly IFI-modelled reforms were being implemented 
throughout the developing world.  Bernard Chidzero, the Finance Minister, advocated economic 
liberalisation throughout the 1980s and his personal influence, along with support from 
prominent black businessmen was instrumental in its approval. 
 
Zimbabwe had inherited a robust but protected economy, along with controversial debts (over 
US$500 million) from the Rhodesian era.
30 The post-Independence administration was 
encouraged, primarily by the IMF, to borrow further and to enter international markets that had 
been inaccessible during sanctions (Williams, 1982). Much of the expenditure was welfare-
oriented and resulted in significant achievements in rural infrastructure, health and education.  
However, with overly optimistic growth projections, land funding pledges, and expectations of 
peace dividends, state expenditure became over-extended.  Development funding pledges did not 
materialise in the amounts expected, mainly due to donor conditions.
31   By 1984, Zimbabwe’s 
external debt had grown to $US 2.4 billion and the debt servicing ratio to 25 percent of exports 
(EIU, 1987: 38).  The drought of 1983/4 and the tobacco sector’s shaky re-entry into world 
markets tempered the envisaged peace dividend.  During the second half of the 1980s, the debt 
burden expanded under a bloated civil service, and a large loss-making parastatal portfolio. 
 
The ESAP package envisaged currency devaluation, reduced government expenditure, 
privatisation and market liberalisation. Although portrayed as a home-grown solution, it was 
                                                
29 “Land plan: New Doubts”, Parade Magazine, December 1990, p. 23. 
30 There have always been contentions over inheriting Rhodesia’s debt, amounting to more than $500 million.  
31 ZIMCORD funding pledges in 1981 exceeded $2 billion, of which only thirty to forty percent actually 
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based on IFI prescriptions and Zimbabwe’s selective and partial adoption of the program 
suggests that key administrators remained opposed to aspects of it.
32   Negative impacts were 
immediately evident.  Inflation rose and real wages declined.  Manufacturing contracted on 
exposure to regional competition and formal urban employment declined by nearly ten percent 
(30,000 jobs). Overall unemployment grew at alarming rates due to increasing school leavers 
against a stagnant job market.   Government spending cuts adversely affected social 
infrastructure and services, particularly in rural areas.   The 1992 drought and the 1995 drought 
exacerbated these difficulties, but as Robertson (2001) illustrated, ESAP was showing longer-
term benefits by 1996/97, when record growth across a more diversified economy was recorded.   
 
Much of this economic growth was skewed towards established capital with international 
connections, most of which was white-owned.  Lower-tier wage earners, smaller businesses and 
communal producers were left exposed to inflation and reduced government spending. Visible 
and widening disparities in wealth all-too-often overshadowed governance issues such as 
selective-empowerment, land tenure restrictions and controversial government expenditure.  
Jenkins (1997) argues that sustained fiscal indiscipline, resulting from unnecessary defence 
expenditure, civil-service salaries, and a growing culture of high-level corruption, absorbed 
critical resources that could otherwise have softened the impacts of ESAP.  Instead, reduced 
spending on welfare services, such as health and education, magnified socio-economic problems.    
 
1.3.1  The Impacts of Structural Adjustment on Commercial Farming  
 
Market deregulation provided commercial farmers with two diversification opportunities: they 
could access export markets or they could exploit restructuring domestic markets.
 Export 
incentives included a nine percent tax reduction and an Export Retention Scheme (ERS), 
allowing exporters to retain a proportion of income in foreign currency, with which to import 
inputs. Two basic strategies for accumulation emerged: intensification on existing land, or 
expansion on increased physical areas.
33  Moyo (2000) identified three significant types of 
export-related expansion: horticulture, cut-flower production and wildlife-related enterprises.  
Domestic-oriented diversification, expansion and vertical-integration strategies emerged later, 
                                                
32 Officials were particularly concerned by the Zambian regime change in 1992, in which SAP reforms undermined 
Kaunda’s power by restricting UNIP’s patronage system. 
33 These land use changes, and particularly the choice between intensification versus expansion, have parallels with 
the strategies of large-scale Orange Free State farmers, observed by Beinart (1984a). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 11 
due to delayed and hesitant market-deregulation.
34  Tobacco and beef were unusual; both 
industries were significant exporters, but controlled through centralised marketing systems.    
 
There was an immediate divide between exporters and producers targeting domestic markets, 
reflected in CFU records.  Antony Swire-Thompson (CFU Vice-President) remarked in 1991 that 
“current policies are encouraging everyone to grow roses or tobacco…food producers are getting 
no incentives at all”.
35   In November of 1991, following a review of foreign currency controls, 
Alan Burl expressed concern that the Export Retention Scheme was not helping domestic 
industries.
36  Oliver Newton (Cereals Producers Association (CPA) Chairman) noted a move 
away from wheat towards export horticulture and, even in 1995, Peter MacSporran (CFU 
President) aired concerns about the financial status of non-exporting farmers.
37  Input costs 
increasingly reflected export prices, and the ‘exporter v local’ divide became a notable plane of 
structural differentiation among farmers, often reflected regionally. 
 
The impact of delayed and partial liberalisation in domestic markets was demonstrated in the 
dairy industry, which experienced a crisis towards the end of 1991. Government reluctance to 
decontrol milk prices, despite input (bran and feed) deregulation earlier in the year, placed dairy 
farmers in a cost-price squeeze.  The Farmer Magazine illustrated that stock feed prices had 
risen by more than 100 percent in one year, amounting to 60 percent of input costs, whilst milk 
prices had declined in real terms.
38  The Dairy Producers’ Association declared that “the current 
fiasco with stock feeds is an example of trade liberalisation gone wrong” and argued that 
deregulation had been started at the wrong end of the processing chain.
39   Pressure on domestic 
producers encouraged many to move into export crops. Although large-scale producers had 
credit access to do so quickly, small-scale producers in communal and resettlement areas did not. 
With time, domestic markets did transform, through commodity exchanges and vertical-
integration opportunities, but these also required capital and favoured large-scale established 
producers.  
 
                                                
34 Initial shocks of currency devaluation and inflation also adversely affected producers targeting domestic markets. 
In the first year of implementation the currency devalued by 30 percent and inflation began to climb (Jenkins, 1997).   
35 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 25 September 1991, p 16. This proved perceptive the following year, 
during the fallout from severe drought.  
36 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 29 November 1991.   
37 A diminishing proportion of farmers did not have some form of export income.   In the Case Study sample, about 
half of the farmers were still wholly domestic-based.  Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 26 April 1995. 
38 The Farmer Magazine, 11 February 1992, p 3. 
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The seventy commercial farms in my case study area revealed interesting patterns in the 1989-
1997 period (Selby, 2006: Appendix I).  More than half of the farms diversified substantially 
during ESAP.  Eight rose projects, nine fresh-produce operations, three field-flower enterprises, 
six citrus orchards, five ostrich schemes, and four tourism-related ventures were started. A co-
operative fresh-produce pack-shed, an ostrich tannery, and a SADC citrus nursery emerged as 
supporting developments. Domestic sector reforms followed, including a large cattle feedlot and 
abattoir, three new butcheries, two industrial milling operations and two commercial bakeries.  
Three dairy producers began processing and two additional farm shops and kiosks were 
established.  About twenty farms did not restructure; they were generally the less-developed 
properties, or secondary holdings and accounted for less than thirty percent of production before 
1990 and less than twenty percent by 1995.
40    Diversification increased and intensified 
production within the survey area.  Export-crop areas increased markedly but because most were 
highly intensive, food-crop areas only declined marginally; maize areas decreased by about 15 
percent, but wheat plantings increased by 30 percent.  Tobacco areas expanded by nearly 20 
percent and permanent employment grew by nearly 25 percent (explained by the proliferation of 
horticultural enterprises).
41 Cattle numbers in the case study area decreased due to the droughts 
and subsequent lack of recovery program, but were compensated in aggregate terms by Parma 
Meat’s intensive feedlot expansion.  
 
Structural adjustment encouraged inward flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), and capital 
flows out of Harare and Bulawayo into rural areas, for farming or tourism ventures.
42 This was 
often through family connections or business contacts, and created further differentiation in local 
farming communities.   FDI consisted of both multinational capital and private capital. Joint 
ventures, such as Luxaflor Roses, were established between white farmers and European 
partners. Similar arrangements spread into the wildlife sector as a number of ranches and lodges 
in Matabeleland, Masvingo and the Midlands were purchased by international investors.  
 
ESAP also exposed variations in farmers’ entrepreneurship and management skills.  Land policy 
and discourse has always emphasized the importance of ‘training’ or ‘knowledge’ among small 
scale farmers, but the ‘skills’ factor is too often dismissed by analysts of the large scale farming 
sector. Chapter One discussed how difficult seasons over time, produced better farmers.  During 
                                                
40  Tobacco systems were conducive financially and management-wise for diversification. 
41 The national tobacco industry grew notably during this period.  Foreign currency earnings increased from $US 
310 million in 1990 to $US 500 million by 1996.    
42 Many Harare based investors struck up rose-growing partnerships with farmers. Discussions with Keith Butler, 
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ESAP, resourceful, hardworking farmers were often rewarded, whereas inflexible operators were 
exposed by macroeconomic shocks such as inflation, exchange rate devaluations and higher 
interest rates. Most successful farming expansions used established advantages of credit access, 
experience and industry contacts, but they also illustrated the importance of skills at practical 
farming levels, and at business and marketing levels.
43  
 
Some of this entrepreneurship carried through to a younger generation of farmers. Moyo (1994: 
18) and Cliffe (1988:315) argue, incorrectly, that children of white farmers were increasingly 
disinterested in farming.  Within the case study area most farming families had at least one son 
or daughter who returned to farm, and at least two children returned in eight of the families.
44     
Many studied internationally, gathering new ideas, new contacts and new marketing channels, 
particularly relevant to export horticulture and tourism.  This also marked a distinct generational 
difference, as few farmers’ sons had been able to study abroad during UDI and the war.
45 ESAP 
was convenient for them, and many soon established multi-million dollar enterprises.
46  These 
operations had many positive impacts but the emergence of young white millionaires against a 
background of increasing hardships in other sectors sent a message to the wider population that 
the legacies of settler privilege were not abating. 
 
Employment and management structures on many farms evolved with structural changes.  Larger 
or more complex farming systems evolved tiered employment structures.  The importance of 
skilled-labour began to challenge racial norms: young white farm assistants were increasingly 
working alongside or under black managers and although such arrangements were isolated, they 
were significant departures from the practices of the past.
47 Vertically integrating farms, such as 
mills and butcheries, required differentiated skills and the emphasis on human resources and 
human capital increased accordingly.  Official records show that labour poaching became a big 
issue between farmers, especially in skilled jobs.
48  Competition for other resources also 
                                                
43 For example, Mike Butler established the largest rose enterprise (100ha) in the southern hemisphere.   The 
Dorward and Micklem families expanded their tobacco systems to become the two biggest private producers in the 
world.  The Nicolle brothers amalgamated their grain farms into the biggest private grain producers in Southern 
Africa, accounting for more than 20 percent of Zimbabwe’s annual wheat production.   
44 Only ten farmers did not have children returning. 
45In the case study area several farmers marketed fresh produce through contacts which they had established at 
College in the UK.    
46 For example, the Ilsinks, Simon Philp, Tobs Strong and Hugo Firks were young entrepreneurs from in or around 
the case study area who took advantage of export markets and vertical integration to expand businesses rapidly.  
47 Alan Ravenscroft, in the case study area employed young graduates from the Tobacco Training Institute, who 
were increasingly working under established black farm managers.  
48 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 27 November 1996.  There were also numerous examples of 
white managers being ‘poached’ within the case study area.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 14 
increased.  Land disputes emerged in certain districts, usually between expanding farmers.
49  A 
series of ‘water wars’ erupted between irrigators, particularly on the Marodzi and Mazowe 
rivers.
50  Competition for markets between butcheries, bakeries and value-added enterprises 
often sparked conflict between individual farmers.  These differences, as with so much of the 
debate, appear to have been invisible to most outsiders, camouflaged by the aggregated gains of 
predominantly white commercial farming, in contrast to the hardships of other sectors.   
 
The changing nature of the production environment and farming profile was reflected in the 
institutional and marketing structure of commercial farming.
51  The Horticultural Producers 
Committee (HPC) and the Wildlife Producers Association (WPA) became new ‘commodity 
boards’ within the CFU.   These shifted regional influences within the CFU and a commission 
was appointed to restructure the institution.
52 ESAP changed the parameters of farmer activities, 
interests and lifestyles.   Opportunities generally entailed harder work and higher risks, but better 
rewards.   Imported luxury goods became available after two decades of relative restrictions, and 
more farmers indulged in power-boats, luxury vehicles and larger farmhouses, highlighting the 
hardships of less successful farmers and other sectors. Many senior farming respondents 
lamented these ostentatious displays of wealth, and identified them as key drivers of class and 
race resentment.
53  In the same way that isolated cases of bad employment, came to dominate 
external perspectives of the sector, so displays of wealth by some farmers shaped the direction 
and tone of public debate.  For example, in Parliament, Minister Mangwende claimed that:  
 
We all know that some commercial farmers after they have accumulated 
enough wealth prefer to buy planes than to build decent accommodation 
for the farm workers who made them rich in the first place.
54 
 
Exporters were often accused of ‘externalising’ foreign currency through transfer-pricing.
55 This 
was true in the late 1990s, as political insecurity mounted, but during the early stages of ESAP 
                                                
49 For example, in Makonde region the Nicolle Brothers expansion of cereal farms, created resentment from other 
farmers who felt marginalised from the land market.  In Glendale, John Sole purchased multiple farms.   
50 The water contests were largely due to the 1992 drought. Shamva and Marodzi water boards experienced several 
court cases regarding water rights and excessive pumping.    
51 For instance, the commodity exchange (ZIMACE) was established for the trading of domestic commodities, 
particularly maize, wheat and soya. 
52 Correspondence with Bill McKinney, August 2005. Interview with Gerry Davidson, Harare, August 2001. 
53 For example, Interview with Denis Norman, Sussex, October 2004. 
54 Extract from Hansard Record of Parliamentary Debate, 12 March 1992.   
55 The most common method is double invoicing, in which exporters sell flowers or produce to an agent or company 
overseas.  A proportion of payment is channelled into an offshore account, whilst the rest is invoiced and paid at a 
deflated price back to the exporter’s foreign currency account in Zimbabwe.   The system is very difficult to police, 
especially if the exporters and agents have a close relationship.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 15 
profits were chiefly recycled into farm infrastructure such as buildings or irrigation systems, but 
also into workers’ housing, schools and clinics as government services declined.
56 Domestic-
oriented producers and tobacco farmers also reinvested profits due to difficulties in securing 
foreign currency, but also because there was a sense of confidence in the sector. In Tsatsi-
Marodzi, ten sizeable dams were constructed during this period and the area under irrigation 
nearly doubled. In response to government spending cuts, a health centre was established, a 
mobile farm clinic toured the district, and six new farm schools were set up.
57  On a visit to the 
Barwick in 1995, Border Gezi, Governor of Mashonaland Central, expressed his surprise at the 
quality and extent of farm-worker facilities on the four farms visited acknowledging that they 
dispelled his preconceptions.
58 Lending from banks to the commercial farming sector increased 
during ESAP and the finance sector’s stake in land and farm infrastructural improvements grew 
accordingly.
59   In due course, capital reinvestment raised the values of farms and land prices.
60 
 
Structural adjustment prompted new land-uses, new crop-types and further financial and social 
stratification. Some commercial farmers overextended their borrowings and went out of business 
during this period, whilst others on traditional maize and cattle systems stagnated.
61   Class 
differentiation began to transcend racial boundaries; many salaried whites, battling with 
inflation, resented business owners (black and white) that were benefiting from market 
liberalisation (Weiss, 1994).  Widening class divisions within the farming communities were 
more complex than during the Rhodesian era and undermined the institutional unity of the CFU.  
 
The impact on the land question was significant.   Moyo’s (2000) research on land-use changes 
during structural adjustment is an important insight into the changing complexity of land 
demand. He argues that the unequal benefits of ESAP reforms fuelled the struggle for more land 
redistribution from both the peasant sector and the empowerment lobby.   This increasing land 
                                                
56 These patterns are based on personal observations of farmer strategies during this period.   Interviews and 
discussions with recently evicted farmers suggest that very few ‘externalised’ significant amounts of foreign 
currency.   In the survey area, five farmers had externalised enough foreign currency to emigrate easily.   
57 During the 1980s, significant improvements in government facilities for health and education reduced farm-
worker dependence on farms.  During the government spending cuts of the 1990s,  these services deteriorated.   
Kerry Kay (CFU Aids representative) argues that farming facilities improved in response, and that this pattern was 
evident across most districts. Neighbouring farmers would sometimes collaborate to spread the costs of schooling or 
on-farm clinics.  For farmers there was a vested-interest, in being able to retain skilled workers.     
58 Personal attendance at the Tsatsi ICA Farmers Association Meeting, August 1996.  Governor Gezi visited 
Willsbridge, Montgomery, Chaddesley and Msorodoni farms.  He reassured farmers at this meeting that they had 
nothing to worry about, as they were demonstrating ‘obvious commitment to Zimbabwean society’. 
59 Discussions with Duncan Hale, Standard Chartered Bank, Harare, October 2003. 
60 Most farm improvements, apart from irrigation infrastructure, were usually concentrated around central locations. 
61 For example, Farnie Ferriera, a successful tobacco grower, bought a model farm near Concession, over-capitalised 
it and was forced into liquidation in the mid-1990s.  At least five other local farmers were in severe financial 
difficulties during the same period. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 16 
demand was amplified by rejuvenated interests from international and urban capital seeking to 
exploit the opportunities of market liberalisation.  A ready supply of land prevailed but land 
improvements increased prices. The growing importance of horticulture and intensification could 
release excess or under-utilised land, but existing legislation prevented the subdivision of 
property (Maposa, 1995).  Subdivision restrictions were originally introduced to curb speculation 
by large companies in the colonial era. Despite being cited as a key constraint to land supply 
they remained in place.  Moyo (2000) acknowledged that this was the prime time to have 
concurrently permitted sub-division and introduced a land tax, which would have allowed price 
and cost differentials between capitalised portions of farms and less developed outlying land.   
 
At the same time, perceptions of white farmer affluence, attitudes and employment style shaped 
discussion in national forums, and influenced public perceptions, which increasingly isolated 
white farmers.  During debates on the Land Acquisition Act in 1992, Mr Bhebe MP commented: 
 
We need to keep a close eye on the commercial farmers… they are playing a yoyo with the 
nation… the white farmers realised that ploughing and all that was hazardous… they 
discovered new types of farming… they discovered that there is a safari business where 
you spend very little, all you have to do is construct a tall wire, to provide water fountains 
from farm to farm, the rest should look after itself…most of the commercial farmers do not 
have farms, only gardens.  They hardly do any farming on those farms.
62 
 
Bhebe was referring to farmers in Matabeleland and specifically to the game conservancies, but 
his sentiments fed into a stereotype.  Even the Minister of Agriculture blatantly distorted facts 
and figures in populist parliamentary addresses:  “right now … the majority of them [white 
farmers] own six or more farms which are mostly being under utilised”.
63   
 
1.3.2  The 1991/1992 Drought 
 
Rain shortages between March 1990 and November 1992 amounted to probably the worst 
drought in Zimbabwe’s recorded history.  The effects have been underestimated in analyses of 
structural adjustment and in terms of its influence on the land debate and the state-farmer 
alliance.
64  The drought interacted with structural adjustment, empowerment and the 1992 LAA 
                                                
62 Hansard Record of Parliamentary Debate, 3 March 1992. 
63 Hansard, Record of Parliamentary Debate, 12 March 1992. 
64 Moyo (1994) and Bond (2000) acknowledge the seriousness of the droughts but fail to note their impact on the 
reconfiguration of the land question. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 17 
to magnify and highlight social, political and economic imbalances. The CFU stated in January 
1992 that it was the worst drought in more than 50 years, particularly in Matabeleland.
65 Council 
noted that the drought had affected livestock and crops, and created massive unemployment in 
the communal areas, which had been the most badly affected.   
 












The severity of the drought was due to its widespread and prolonged nature.  Livestock could not 
be moved locally, crops could not recover, and water storage shortages carried through to the 
irrigated winter crop and the following season’s storage levels. The economy contracted by ten 
percent, the first negative growth rate in a decade, with significant implications for structural 
adjustment. 
66    The impact of the drought affected all regions, not just the traditionally 
vulnerable provinces.   John Meikle reported that the Eastern highlands had experienced one of 
the most difficult seasons on record.  Dave Henson described the situation in Masvingo: 
 
Catastrophic…unbelievable, worst in living memory, absolutely disastrous…It is fair to 
say that this is the worst position that most commercial farmers in the province have ever 
found themselves in… the situation in the communal lands is even worse.
 67   
 
In February, Nick Swanepoel noted that Makonde region had received the lowest rainfall since 
1927 and Alan Burl stressed that the current drought was the worst on record.
68  Under these 
pressures ‘squatter’ problems re-emerged in the public forum. Stock theft, poaching and petty 
theft increased in commercial farming areas, especially those bordering communal areas.  CFU 
                                                
65 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 29 January, 1992. 
66 Also see World Bank (2004). 
67 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 29 January, 1992: Masvingo Regional Report. 
















1985  1990 1995  2000  2002 
Sources: IMF statistics (2001) 
Drought years 
% Growth 
in GDP QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 18 
regional representatives linked this to the drought and distinguished these patterns from the 
squatting tactics of the 1980s, arguing that the recent activities were more general and 
widespread, and not as focused or organized, even though they coincided with renewed and fiery 
land rhetoric.
69  Similar observations emerged after the 1994/5 drought.
70 
 
The alliance between the farmers and the state was supported and undermined by different 
elements of structural adjustment and the drought.  Farmers increased their proportions of 
foreign currency generation which bolstered the sector’s position and the 1992 drought 
reinforced the dependency on commercial farmers and irrigation infrastructure for food security.  
The drought also exacerbated the stark contrasts between communal areas and commercial land: 
an increasingly inconvenient and awkward contradiction, which resurfaced in the land debate.   
 
1.4 THE POLARISATION OF THE LAND DEBATE 
 
The appointment of Witness Mangwende as Minister of Lands and Agriculture in 1990 indicated 
a political shift in the role of the Ministry.   Mangwende had limited agricultural experience and 
was regarded by most farmers who knew him as part of a ‘hardline’ element within ZANU PF, a 
‘hatchet man’. Nevertheless, David Hasluck and John Meikle cautioned CFU council members 
against adopting confrontational stances towards government.
71 However, the draft Land 
Acquisition Bill of 2 November 1990 unexpectedly carried a compulsory acquisition clause, 
without legal recourse or appeal.
72  The CFU Council, caught off guard, called an emergency 
meeting of all members on 11 January 1991, held in the international conference centre at the 
Sheraton Hotel.  It was the biggest ever gathering of white commercial farmers (4380 attended), 
and created a traffic gridlock in Harare.
73  The agenda focused on a hastily compiled report 
entitled “CFU Proposals for Land Reform”. It was a bid to work with government, to maintain 
some influence over the process, but lacked practical detail or implementation suggestions. Its 
most significant message, the call for an independent land board to adjudicate the issue, was lost 
behind the negative interpretations of the meeting.  
                                                
69 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 28 October 1992.  As many as 2 million rural dwellers relocated to urban 
areas during the 1992 drought. 
70 Increased squatting in Odzi, Chinoyi, Angwa and Makonde was mainly based on gold panning and poaching. 
Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 31 May 1995 and 25 October 1995.  
71 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 26 September 1990. 
72 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 28 November, 1990: Lands and Legislation.  
73 Some farmers compared these scenes to strategies adopted by French farmers, who frequently jam the Paris ring 
road to protest against unwelcome agricultural policies.  Interestingly, CFU records note that white farmers from the 
Transvaal drove tractors into Pretoria later that month, in protest at South African reforms.  Whether or not there 
was a contagion element is not known.  Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 30 January 1991.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 19 
 
The meeting was timed strategically to precede the initial strikes of the first Gulf War, to ensure 
global press coverage.
74 It was termed the ‘Great Indaba’, in reference to the meetings of the 
Ndebele nation, as an attempt to portray commercial farmers as Africans, which simply 
provoked mirth within the ruling party, as Mangwende later noted in parliament.
75 Denis 
Norman, who had recently resumed a cabinet position, was deeply concerned about potential 
interpretations and ramifications, particularly by the ruling party. John Laurie, John Strong and 
Jim Sinclair were equally apprehensive and tried to persuade Alan Burl, the new CFU President, 
to cancel the meeting, or to clarify its objectives.   At a pre-arranged breakfast, facilitated by 
Denis Norman, Burl was unreceptive from the outset, apparently arriving forty minutes late with 
a joke about the obsolescence of past-presidents.
76  
 
Denis Norman explained that a confrontational stance would breakdown the hard-earned ‘trust’ 
that had been developed with the government, whilst Laurie and Sinclair felt it could scupper the 
whole alliance.  However, Burl had support from council and stood his ground.
77 David Hasluck 
(CFU Director) felt that the meeting was a necessary exercise to raise awareness within the 
international community and to demonstrate the power and unity of the farming community.
78 
John Brown supported Burl on the basis of council solidarity, as did Anthony Swire-Thompson. 
This dismissal of the concerns of previous leaders demonstrated a new and different style of 
CFU leadership: more aggressive and more public.
79 
 
Operationally, the Sheraton meeting ran smoothly and initial press reports were generally 
favourable. Mangwende clarified two important issues: firstly, that the five million hectares 
targeted was non-negotiable and, secondly, that productive farmers had nothing to worry about. 
On his subsequent ‘meet the farmers’ tour,  Mangwende repeatedly assured farmers countrywide 
                                                
74 Mangwende apparently complained that he was forced to cut short a family holiday and to cancel a state visit with 
President Mugabe. Interview with Alan Burl, Marondera, January 2004. 
75 See Hansard Record of Parliamentary Debate, 12 March 1993. 
76 Past presidents of the CFU traditionally met with the incumbent leadership once a month, but this practice had 
gradually lapsed in the late 1980s. Interview with John Strong, Harare, February 2003; Interview with John Laurie, 
Harare, February 2003;  Interview with Denis Norman, Sussex, October 2004. 
77 Interview with Alan Burl, Marondera, January 2004.  There is little detail of attitudes towards the meeting in the 
CFU minutes, but David Hasluck supported Burl on the basis of council sentiment.  John Meikle claims the he was 
the only council member to oppose the meeting.  E-mail correspondence with John Meikle, June 2005.  
78 Interview with David Hasluck, Nyanga March 2003. 
79 After the meeting, Mr Foot (CFU Public Relations officer) was congratulated on having done a good job.  
Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting 30 January 1991. In the latter half of 1991, Mr Foot acknowledged the union’s 
move away from a non-confrontational approach. The minutes also claim that the more aggressive stance had done 
no harm. Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 25 September 1991and Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 27 
November 1991. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 20 
that the concept of ‘willing buyer - willing seller’ would remain.  However, he also instructed the 
CFU to identify underutilised land.  If they did not, he warned, government would.
80   Many 
farmers were disillusioned after the January meeting and most CFU regional branches reported 
low morale among their members. The depressed tone of district reports contrasts with head 
office minutes.
81 Matabeleland farmers were particularly unhappy that the report, the meeting 
and the agenda had been devised by the CFU leadership with little consultation, participation or 
support from members. Hasluck explained that this was due to time constraints.
82  
 
However, most farmers across their divisions missed the background impacts of the meeting. 
The idea of a privileged, but politically illegitimate, white minority publicly challenging 
government’s land policy was unacceptable to many in ZANU PF.
83  An amicable ‘Meet the 
Farmers’ tour by Mangwende soon afterwards concealed this hostility, but the ruling party was 
alerted to the organizational abilities of the CFU and to their new-found preparedness to confront 
aspects of government land policy.   The CFU soon became aware of these realities.  On 22 
January, Hasluck and Burl met with Mangwende, Attorney General Patrick Chinamasa and 
Permanent Secretary of Lands and Agriculture Ndimande.  The meeting lasted four hours, was 
often heated and “certainly not constructive from the Union’s point of view”.
 84  The CFU 
council agreed that the next strategy was to lobby the private sector to encourage government to 
abandon designation and work with a market-based reform program.     In mid-February, David 
Hasluck met with Michael Camdessus (IMF Director) and with Bernard Chidzero (Finance 
Minister).  Camdessus was reviewing ESAP reforms and apparently: 
 
made clear his disapproval of the controversial constitutional amendments...which 
could jeopardize the economic reform program… [and warned that] land reform can be 
the best or the worst of things, depending on its implementation.
85   
 
Chidzero reassured them that the program would proceed under the willing-buyer willing-seller 
system and that productive farms would not be targeted. Market-based reforms were conducive 
to ESAP, but designation was not.  Under these reassurances Camdessus was confident that the 
forthcoming Paris Donors Conference, which sought to raise US$1 billion of credit for structural 
                                                
80 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 27 February 1991. 
81 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 30 January 1991. 
82Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting 30 January 1991.   Bill McKinney cited this as a precursor to the split of the 
Matabeleland Farmers Union from CFU in 2004.  E-mail correspondence with Bill McKinney, August 2005. 
83 Interview with Dr Kumbirai Kangai, Harare, December 2003.  Dr Robbie Mupawose also commented on the 
misjudgements of this initiative.  Interview with Dr Robbie Mupawose, Harare, January 2004.  
84 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 29 January 1991. 
85 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 27 February 1991: 4. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 21 
adjustment, would deliver sufficient funding.  This confirmed the emergence of two ‘camps’ 
within the administration.  The CFU perceived one as compliant and reassuring, and the other as 
radical, uninformed and unreasonable.  There were two significant errors in farmer policies at 
this stage: the overestimation of their own power and the underestimation of this second ‘camp’. 
 
1.4.1  Market versus Compulsory Acquisition  
 
As the land question polarised, so debates about market reform versus compulsory acquisition 
intensified.
86  Roth (1994) argued that the 1992 LAA was unnecessary and that the ability of the 
market to deliver land was underestimated.  Maposa (1995) identified the legal and practical 
shortfalls of compulsory acquisition. Analyses of the South African land market, suggest that the 
externalities of compulsory reform, such as legal contests, are unpredictable and often more 
timely and costly in the long run, than a market system of transfer.
87   Moyo (1994: 5), 
conversely, argued that market reform had failed to deliver satisfactory quantities or quality of 
land, and that it was therefore necessary to resort to compulsory purchase: 
 
government sought a transparent, legal and administrative framework for land acquisition, 
which was democratically enacted by parliament, and which is explicit about compensating 
land owners. The Land Act seeks an administratively swift process for acquiring land by 
minimising legal contestations of land designations, while clearly articulating the reasons 
for land designations…   government has finally established an appropriate legislative and 
administrative machinery to pursue a credible land redistribution program. 
 
He also argued that the two systems could work concurrently and complement each other. 
Moyo’s view is problematic for three reasons: Firstly, government hardly entered the land 
market in the late 1980s, nor did it intervene through credit, land taxes, or subdivision.
 88   
Secondly, the compulsory acquisition act was ultimately impractical. It was vulnerable to legal 
challenges and prompted a united coalition of opposition among farmers, business, civil society 
and donors.
89  Finally, the two systems undermined each other.  Compulsory acquisition 
removed any real incentive for government to enter the land market, while the existence of an 
active transfer market undermined the credibility of compulsory acquisition.  
                                                
86 For example, see: Roth (1994); Maposa (1995); Moyo (2000b). 
87 For example, see Bernstein (1994). 
88 The 1992 amendments sought to update and strengthen the 1985 Land Acquisition Act. Palmer (1990) shows that 
more than 1 million hectares changed hands through the first-option system between 1985 and 1990.  
89 Edison Zvobgo, ZANU PF’s legal ‘supremo’, subsequently acknowledged the shortfalls of the legislation during a 
conference in Copenhagen in 2001. Personal correspondence with Dr Jocelyn Alexander, Oxford, May 2005.  
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The 1992 Land bill sought to change the nature and basis of land identification and the amount 
and timing of compensation.
90   Two aspects of the bill concerned the farmers. Firstly, the ability 
to designate land compulsorily and, secondly, alteration of the compensation clause from 
‘adequate’ and ‘timely’ to ‘fair’ and ‘staggered’.  ‘Fair’ implied a political levy on the price of 
land whilst ‘staggered’ removed any urgency from government obligations to pay compensation.  
In ignoring the time value of money (no interest would be paid on delayed or staggered 
compensation which would be exposed to inflation) the bill undermined a fundamental principle 
of the financial system.    From an individual farmer’s perspective there were no incentives to 
offer land on this basis, particularly whilst an active open market operated alongside.     
 
The designation principle was driven by political sentiment; it indicated the growing impatience 
and shifting locus of decision-making within land politics, which Mr Munyoro (MP) articulated 
in parliament: 
 
for the last ten years we have been telling people that we cannot do anything because 
our hands are tied and people have not forgotten that we told them that our hands are 
tied.  Why are we developing cold feet now… This bill without designation in it is not 
worth considering at all, just throw it away as a worthless piece of paper.  It must 
entrench designation, then it may become a useful bill.
91 
 
Chief Justice Gubbay criticized the constitutional amendments, and warned that the new 
compensation clause would undermine property rights - a pillar of the constitution.  He argued 
that Judges were custodians of the constitution and therefore had an obligation to comment.
 92   
Moyo (1994) argues that this public judicial criticism undermined the credibility of the exercise, 
but concerns over designation were not restricted to white farmers, chief justices and 
international donors.
 The ZFU submitted a land proposal to the government registering concerns 
about the land bill, and particularly the clauses regarding compulsory designation and 
compensation.
93   Even the ICFU expressed concern at the compensation clause.   In the 
                                                
90 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 28 November, 1990: Lands and legislation. 
91 Extract from Hansard Record of Parliamentary Debate, 3 March, 1992. 
92 The Farmer, 17 January 1991: 1. 
93 Copy of the ZFU proposal on land reform, appended to Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting 26 February 1992. 
The NFAZ and the ZNFU expressed similar concerns directly to the CFU the previous year, before they merged as 
the ZFU.  Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 25 September 1991. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS142  Page 23 
meantime the CFU lobbied third parties, briefing diplomats and members of the donor 
community about the concerns of compulsory acquisition.
94     
 
Most farmers did not believe that an indiscriminate compulsory acquisition process would follow 
and were encouraged by some officials to think that the willing-buyer willing-seller process 
would prevail (von Blackenburg, 1994). The land market continued to function actively. On 
average, about 150 farms were being bought and sold on the open market every year during the 
1990s.  The Farmer began publishing detailed lists of monthly farm sales and prices, using deed 
registry data, to inform the general public about the availability of land.
95 The state moved half-
heartedly, with the belief that it could always resort to compulsory acquisition.  Very clear here, 
but absent in most analysis, is that there was never any agreement.  Both groups fumbled 
forward expecting the issue to resolve itself on their preferred terms.   The most striking feature 
of the standoff was the lack of compromise through land market interventions, and in particular 
the failure to implement land taxes.
96 
 
1.4.2  Land Taxes 
 
Debates around land taxes reflected the increasing complexity of the land problem and the 
manner in which obvious compromises were overlooked.   Levies on land ownership could have 
provided the farmers with a route back into a market-based system of reform, but they failed to 
see the opportunity and would not trust government or the World Bank to formulate one.  A land 
tax could have concurrently oiled the transfer of land by increasing supply and reducing prices. 
Hypothecation of these revenues would have amounted to a material contribution towards land 
reform by the white farmers and demonstrated goodwill within the process. 
 
Land taxes were not new and had been used at various stages in the past.  The Moffat 
government had passed “a mild land tax” in 1928, to counter land speculation, but it was only 
enforced until 1932 (Palmer, 1977: 185). A form of land tax always existed in Rural Council 
Rates, levied on the size of properties.  During settlement negotiations in 1979, John Laurie, 
representing CFU Salisbury branch, called for a government land fund, prompting discussions 
                                                
94 Hasluck met the US Ambassador, representatives of USAID, and members of several other foreign missions to 
brief them about concerns over the designation and compensation clauses. 
95 In October and November 1995, 31 farms, totalling about 15000 ha were bought and sold, mainly in regions II 
and III, for a total price of $20 million (average price: Z$1300/ha; $US90/ha). The Farmer, 1 February 1996: 12.   
96 The World Bank and other analysts had strongly recommended an interventionist market approach, based on land 
taxes and more lenient subdivision legislation. For example, see: World Bank (1991); Bratton (1991); Rukuni 
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about the merits of a land tax.  In 1982/3 further discussions took place and an Agricultural Land 
Tax Bill was recommended to the Tax commissioner.  In 1986 the World Bank argued that: “if a 
land tax is necessary to encourage a more efficient use of land, it should be relatively simple to 
administer and not impede efficiency.”    The 1989 ZANU PF congress land paper and the New 
National Land Policy in 1990 both carried central clauses for land taxes.  Moyo (1986, 1994 and 
1998) called for land taxes over an extended period of time, whilst the Rukuni Commission 
(1994) recommended land taxes, subdivision and tenure reform.  Despite agreement in principle 
among policy makers there was no delivery. The World Bank (2004: 49) details a chronological 
list of land market recommendations to the Zimbabwean government since 1990 and queries 
why none of the suggestions were adopted.
97    
 
Many farmers supported the idea of land taxes: if implemented effectively, they amounted to an 
insurance mechanism for productive farmers by exposing underutilised or speculative land.  
They also promoted both equity and efficiency. During council debates in 1991, the CFU 
showed an awareness of government funding shortages.  Mr Alcock suggested that “it would 
(also) be desirable to raise a levy on income tax to enable the government to have sufficient 
funds available, to pay for and adequately compensate land purchased for resettlement.”  It was 
also suggested, somewhat hopefully, that Britain might consider compensating the difference 
between the price of designated land and the price of normal market-based reform.
98 Keith 
Harvey raised the idea of a land board and land taxes at the CFU Congress in 1992, ideas which 
were presented to government and later to the Rukuni Commission (1994).
99   
 
Following the passing of the Land Act, an Agricultural Land Tax Bill was tabled in 1993 
proposing two possible means of land levy: either on production, or on land potential.
100  CFU 
council initially agreed that the second option was better and that every farmer should have an 
approved farm potential plan within 3 years.
101  David Hasluck then explained problems with 
regional classification, and argued that production rather than potential was better.
102   This 
illustrated the divided opinions over taxes and the manner in which David Hasluck, well-versed 
                                                
97 In addition, The World Bank’s Agricultural Sector Memorandum (1991) calls for a land tax and for subdivision 
leniency.  In 1995 the Bank submitted detailed proposals for a graduated land tax, and suggested the removal of all 
subsidies inflating land prices.  In 1996 the World Bank advised VAT and a land tax within two years (Minutes of 
the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 27 November 1996). In 1998, at the Donors conference, the bank resubmitted 
this proposal, which was unanimously accepted by all stakeholders (World Bank, 2004).    
98 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 27 March 1991: 2. Minutes of CFU Council Meeting, 27 February 1991 
99 Minutes of the CFU Congress, August 1992. 
100 In June 1991, Hasluck attempted, unsuccessfully, to discuss the proposed tax with the Commissioner of Taxes. 
He feared a last minute, non-consultative implementation. Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 26 June 1991. 
101 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 27 May 1993. 
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in the legalities and terminology of the land discourse, used his relative expertise to influence the 
council position. He had previously assessed the proposed Bill draft in an internal memo, 
criticizing it extensively but unconvincingly (Selby, 2006: Appendix II).
103   
 
At a second Paris Donor conference, in March 1995, the World Bank presented a paper entitled:  
“Achieving Shared Growth”
 .
104  It encouraged a market-based approach to land transfer and 
advocated a graduated land tax as a core element– based on land area, quality and location.
105 
Hasluck firmly rejected the paper in council, arguing that the underutilization estimates were 
exaggerated and that the proposed system of land tax would be too complicated.
 106  During a 
CFU debate later that year, Hasluck again opposed the idea of a tax claiming that it would be 
costly and complicated.
107  Hasluck’s opposition to the tax was an example of the perceived 
‘resistance to reform’ within the CFU, at which much government criticism has since been 
directed. Land taxes also posed a conflict of interest for key councillors: Hasluck owned 1500 
hectares in Burma Valley (Region I) which would have been subjected to a significant tax.  
David Irvine, Hasluck’s ally on council, also criticised the land tax but owned significant 
amounts of property in Mashonaland ( Region IIA). However, the CFU remained divided on the 
subject: Bob Swift and Gerry Grant who visited Brazil in 1998, supported the idea of a land tax 
at the Donors Conference.
108 Indeed many of my respondents in Mashonaland did not oppose 
land taxes. Those from Matabeleland and Lowveld were generally supportive in principle on 
condition that natural region and topography considerations were included.
109  Some respondents 
acknowledge in hindsight that land taxes, which they had originally perceived as negative, 
should have been promoted as a positive form of insurance for farmers.  Instead, CFU’s negative 
portrayal of land taxes seems, in hindsight, to have been short-sighted. 
 
In September 1996, the Land Tax was still being debated.
110   It came to the fore again during the 
1998 Donors’ Conference, twenty years after the CFU first discussed land taxes as a safety net 
for land funding. Whilst the CFU debated, procrastinated, and failed to see land taxes as a 
solution rather than a problem, the government appears to have done even less.  Constitutionally, 
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the Land Tax bill was less controversial than the 1992 LAA, but received very little 
parliamentary attention.  Whilst the LAA had been fast-tracked through parliament, the Land 
Tax Bill remained on the table but off the agenda.  The 1996 Tobacco Levy Act was 
subsequently rushed through, despite farmer outrage (See Chapter Five), and yet the Land Tax 
Bill remained in the background.  Moyo (1994: 7) could offer no explanation either: 
 
the state had been reluctant for unclear reasons [own emphasis] to use other measures 
such as land taxes to induce land redistribution and availability…Nor did the state 
encourage private land transfers in line with its rigorous regulation of land sub-division.  
 
Renson Gasela, General Manager of the GMB at the time, suggests that this was due to 
“parliamentary lethargy” and that the 1992 LAA satiated immediate pressures for land policy 
within the ruling party:  “they thought they had enough fire-power in the 1992 Act, but 
overlooked its toothlessness”.
111  Dr Kangai, Dr Mupawose and Denis Norman all claim to have 
supported the idea but could offer no explanations as to why it was not implemented.
112  The 
land tax debate remains a conundrum, and a missed opportunity, probably sidelined by more 




1.4.3  Diminishing Farmer Consultations 
 
The waning proximity of commercial farmers to the policy-making process was particularly 
evident during the 1992 LAA negotiations. At the Sheraton meeting and its provincial follow 
ups, Minister Mangwende promised farmers that they would be consulted throughout the 
drafting of the bill.  In March, Emmerson Mnangagwa, Minister of Justice, Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs, reassured the CFU that it would have access to updated copies of the draft 
throughout the process.
114   He stressed that the bill would target underutilized, absentee or 
foreign-owned farms, and not resident productive farmers.
115   However, in June, Mnangagwa 
claimed that he was unable to provide the CFU with a draft, as that was the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Lands Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (MLARR), but he explained that it was 
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unlikely to reach parliament before September.
116  The MLARR referred the CFU back to 
Mnangagwa.  CFU minutes then document regular, but unsuccessful, requests to view the draft. 
In September they record that although the sixth draft of the Land Act had been produced, the 
CFU had still not seen it.
 117   At the end of October the minutes record that there is “still no 
reply from the MLARR regarding requests for a copy of the Land Acquisition Act -  (nearly) a 
year after the first request, four formal letters and monthly verbal requests”.
118  The Lands and 
Legislation report from this meeting notes that:  
 
the final draft of the Land Acquisition Bill is shortly to be considered by the cabinet 
committee on legislation…there is grave concern… Minister Mangwende had promised the 
CFU an opportunity to comment on the Bill before it was sent to the cabinet committee. 
 
In response, Alan Burl wrote another letter to Mangwende requesting a copy of the draft.
119  In 
November, Burl received a reply stating that when the Bill was in working order it would be sent 
to the union for comment.
120   A copy of the Bill was finally made available on 27 January 1992, 
allowing three weeks for review (ICG 2004). 
 
There were also three pending international issues affecting the manner in which the Bill was 
being drafted: firstly, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), secondly, 
the Donors’ Conference in Paris at which funds for ESAP were to be raised, and thirdly, the 
South African settlement.  In each case, the controversial clauses of the Bill had possible 
implications.  CFU minutes in November note that the government was making a conscious 
effort to keep the profile of the Act low within these forums.
121  
 
Mugabe asked to meet Alan Burl in mid-February, and encouraged him to discuss amendments 
with the relevant Minister, Mnangagwa.
122   One week later, Burl and Hasluck were called to 
Parliament, where they were presented with a single A4 sheet of paper with some minor 
handwritten amendments. According to Mnangagwa “it was government’s intention to pass the 
bill… this was their policy and they would not be swayed – irrespective of whether it was fair or 
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not, or whether it would work or not”.
123  At the subsequent CFU council meeting it was noted 
that “the bill had been presented as a fait accompli, without much chance or opportunity for 
discussion”
 .
124  It was decided that a letter should be sent to Mugabe, to record that there had 
been no opportunity for discussion.  Council also resolved that key stakeholders such as the 
Judiciary and the Zimbabwe Chamber of Commerce should be kept informed about the lack of 
consultation.  On March 12, Mangwende responded to the CFU in Parliament: 
 
there have been lots of allegations from the farming community that they were not 
consulted in the process…The truth is that consultations took place at several 
stages…It is not justifiable to claim that farmers were not consulted.  They were 
consulted.  The kind of consultation they mean is actual involvement in the drafting 
of the bill itself.  Obviously as a government we cannot allow that …What the 
commercial farmers are implying is that because they gave us their views, which 
were not acceptable to us, then they were not consulted.
 125 
 
In the meantime, the CFU launched a publicity campaign, securing four television slots with 
ZBC, for information documentaries on commercial agriculture.
126   The Farmer magazine 
published a major review of the land issue.
127  The ZTA joined the initiative and took out full-
page advertisements in the Financial Gazette and the Herald, emphasizing the importance of 
commercial agriculture to the economy and warning of the potential consequences of 
designation.
128   Mangwende reacted to the press campaign in Parliament: 
 
Already the public is being bombarded with a concerted campaign against land 
distribution.  We have seen big adverts in bold print in the Herald [by ZTA] against 
designation.  There have been similar insidious articles in the Pink paper… recently 
there has been a video… intending to persuade people [that] white commercial 
farmers are the only ones who can use land properly… to portray the African as a 
pathetic and incompetent peasant and therefore not deserving to be given land…
129 
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Moyo (1994: 1 and 4) argues that the dominance of the CFU in media outlets and on policy 
forums presented a distorted perspective on Zimbabwe’s land problem, and that the 
government’s own distorted portrayal of the issue as a contest between “greedy landowners and 
the majority of land hungry peasants” was justified on the basis that most of the poor did see it in 
these simple terms.   The press campaign was convincing enough to raise concerns among 
donors which Mangwende sought to diffuse by clarifying government objectives in parliament: 
 
the government will map out areas that will remain under LSCF and those that need 
to be purchased for resettlement purposes.  In this way people who intend to buy 
farms will know which areas to go for.  Those farmers who need to relocate 
themselves as a result of being displaced by resettlement will be able to buy farms in 
areas where they will guarantee that they will not be required to move again.
130 
 
This implied that certain commercial farming areas would remain untargeted, and that others 
would be resettled on a ‘block’ basis.  He then contradicted himself, within minutes, by 
promoting a more selective approach based on the nature of individual farms:  
 
The kind of designation we are talking about is different from mere designation in 
blanket form.  What we will be looking for is land which falls under the following 
categories: underutilised land under absentee ownership, foreign owned land, derelict 
land, land owned for speculative purposes and land from people with more  
farms than are considered necessary.
131 
 
Although the initial ‘block’ maps were drawn up, the program shifted increasingly towards the 
second approach, after the appointment of Dr Kumbirai Kangai as Minister of Lands Agriculture 
and Rural Resettlement in July 1992.  This was widely seen as a conciliatory gesture and Kangai 
immediately compromised, explaining that the land program would proceed on both fronts, but 
that emphasis would be placed on securing land through ‘willing-buyer willing-seller’. So 
compulsory acquisition was to run alongside market reform, and selective identifications were to 
complement block designations.  It was a case of choosing all routes without actually taking any.   
These inconsistencies in official stances carried through to the land identification exercise.   
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1.4.4  Conceptualising ‘Under-Utilised’ Land  
 
The World Bank (1991) claimed that 65 percent of commercial farmland in Zimbabwe was 
underutilised. This statistic was widely cited in subsequent land debates, including parliamentary 
deliberations over the 1992 LAA.
132    ‘Underutilisation’ was a key argument for promoting 
extensive land reform but its conceptualisation remained problematic.
133  Roth (1994), who co-
authored the above-mentioned report, acknowledged broad assumptions in his calculations and 
that depending on land-use definitions, the area of underutilised land in Mashonaland could vary 
between 1.5 and 3 million hectares.
134 Due to the varied topography of individual farms, the 
margin for error in such an exercise without individual surveys is significant.
135   Hasluck 
claimed that the World Bank exaggerated the degree of inefficiency of commercial agricultural 
land and that the report made “expedient suggestions” regarding further land purchases.
136     
Within parliamentary debate, the concepts of ‘underutilisation’ and multiple-ownership were 
important, but often distorted.  Contextualising Minister Magwende’s earlier quote:  
 
right now (the white farmers) are busy stocking most of their underutilised land with 
wildlife… the majority of them own six or more farms which are mostly being under 
utilised.  Surely we need all that underutilised land for resettlement.
137 
 
Against the distortions and misinformation of high level debate, concentrations of land 
ownership were ignored.  Stoneman (1981: 135) illustrates that at Independence, 216 properties 
accounted for more than one-third of white-owned land, and that 736 farms (eleven percent by 
number) incorporated more than 60 percent.
138 These properties were owned by multinationals, 
large companies and a number of private ‘land barons’. Leibigs, Lonrho, Hippo Valley and 
Triangle estates owned more than 750 000 ha between them.   At the other extreme, 55 percent 
of farms by number (averaging 425 ha) occupied less than ten percent of the total white-owned 
area, and were mainly privately owned family farms.   
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Roth (1994: 144) illustrated similar concentrations of ownership in 1988.  He showed that more 
than half of all white farmers occupied less than one million hectares countrywide, or less than 
ten percent of all privately-owned land (Selby 2006: Appendix III). One-third of all white 
farmers (1400 by number) resided on only 500 000 hectares in Mashonaland.   The productivity 
and utilisation debates regarding farm size remain unclear, but in my survey area productivity 
was generally higher on smaller farms (Selby 2006: Appendix I). Larger or multiple-farm 
structures tended to concentrate enterprises in core areas, with less intensive outlying areas. 
Larger farms were generally situated on more broken country.
139 The implications of these 
statistics are significant.  Highly concentrated ownership was acknowledged by Rukuni (1994) 
and Moyo (2000a) but never incorporated effectively into land policy through, for example, 
graded land taxes. Furthermore, within the national land targets to transfer 5 million hectares, the 
smallest 2410 commercial farms (occupying less than 1 million hectares) were hardly worth 
considering, even in the better regions.  Most interesting is that the pattern of vast landholdings 
by a few individuals and companies still survived from the 1890s, remarkably unchallenged. 
 












It is surprising that there was not more internal policy focus within the CFU, within the 
independent press or within academia, to encourage the companies and ‘land barons’ to release 
some land. But there were more obvious cases of massive underutilised land holdings in the 
public sector.  The CFU and the press turned their attention towards examples such as Nuanetsi 
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ranch, and state farmland owned by ARDA and the Cold Storage Commission.   The 
independent press also began advertising black-owned farms that were underutilised, often 
ignoring the historical disadvantages for new black farmers.  Even Minister Mangwende 
sometimes argued that these were irrelevant: 
 
The land question should be considered a national question not a racial issue…we have 
always said that if land is underutilised, it should be taken for resettlement, no matter 
who owns it (HON.MEMBERS:  Hear Hear)
140 
 
Kangai subsequently offered a more qualified opinion:  
 
Officials are aware of the constraints which have hit our people hard…that they have not 
been able to develop their farms, but if one is sitting here with all the political connections 
…and has not developed his farm, I do not think we will have sympathy with him. 
141 
 
Parade magazine then published an article detailing the derelict state of Senior Minister Msika’s 
farm in Concession, revealing that he had failed to service his $30000 AFC loan since 1981.  
This was followed by a series of press articles revealing the multiple ownership and 
underutilisation of farms by senior officials.
 142   There was a general consensus within 
government that the CFU had initiated the articles as a secondary more aggressive stage to their 
press campaign.
143  Moyo (1994) sensed naivety in the farmer reactions: 
 
To boot (the white farmers’)… insistence that Minister’s farms be designated first, 
showed how oblivious they were to the realpolitik.  Direct confrontations with farming 
politicians implied that white farmers were ready for political struggle over the land 
question, despite their weak political constituency…white opponents of land reform have 
negatively fuelled the racial question through their attempts to caricature black rule 
 
From CFU’s viewpoint this realpolitik was being exploited. Hasluck argues that CFU’s stance 
had less to do with race than with practical discrepancies: 
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An indigenous owner on a derelict farm was more politically legitimate than a white owner 
on a productive farm.  There were massive parastatal land-holdings lying virtually derelict … 
These sort of double standards were very difficult to explain to (CFU) members when their 
productive properties were being identified for compulsory acquisition.
144 
 
But this statement illustrates how inherently race-connected the issue was.  It was about practical 
discrepancies, along racial lines, which were a historical legacy.  So in 1993, Government 
seemed intent on designating white farms despite massive unsettled state landholdings, whilst the 
CFU appeared oblivious to the negative political impacts in publicising underutilised black-
owned farms.  Behind this, debates about utilisation and productivity were clouded and 
misinformed on both sides, squandering opportunities for consensual or practical solutions. 
 
1.4.5  Contentions over Land Identification and Land Allocations 
 
The problems and politics of defining ‘underutilised’ land spilled into the farm identification 
exercise. When Minister Mangwende toured the commercial farming areas in 1991, each 
farmers’ association agreed to identify potential resettlement land and to prepare an illustrative 
map accordingly.
145  Farmer approaches to the issue were generally enthusiastic at this stage. In 
February 1991, it had been agreed in Council that the CFU should be involved in designating 
land, and continue to develop the information system and map. 
146  However, by April 1991,    
 
All areas felt very strongly that the Union should not rush to Government with any offers, 
but rather prepare their cases, area by area and wait for the approach from Government… 
many farmers were expressing the view that the crunch may not come.
147   
 
Anthony Swire-Thompson explained that it was “not the intention of the CFU to get involved 
with the designation of land, but it was important that they participated in the identification”.
148  
By the end of 1994, Peter Macsporran had refuted the 1991 resolution : 
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it never was and never will be the CFU’s duty to identify land for designation and it 
distresses me that rumors to the contrary persist – however when land is identified by 
AGRITEX, we help do an assessment of that particular piece of land in conjunction 
with all members of the Provincial Lands Identification Committees (PLICs).
149 
 
The CFU’s changing stance in council was largely irrelevant to the process on the ground, but 
reflected some members’ concerns that involvement in designation created problems between 
members.  Provincial and district CFU representatives described the social and ethical 
difficulties of identifying land from members of their farming communities. The point was made 
repeatedly that the owners of underutilised farms were often difficult to deal with – they were 
“awkward and volatile, and usually embarrassed”.
150   However, by distancing itself from 
‘designation’ the CFU risked accelerating its waning proximity to the process.   
 
All commercial farming areas had formed land identification committees by Easter 1992 and 
these were represented on the Provincial Lands Identification Committees (PLICs) along with 
members of local government, the ruling party and Agritex.
151  In the middle of 1992, provincial 
officers from Agritex received a directive from the Ministry requiring the identification of ten 
farms in each province.  In practice, land identification varied significantly between different 
provinces. Appendix IV summarises these differences.  Whilst the process began well, political 
interferences came to dominate the work of the PLICs in most provinces, even when lists of 
farms had been consensually agreed with commercial farmers.  For example, in Masvingo, 
mutually agreed properties were identified and offered, but rejected by head office in Harare, on 
the basis that they were only in two ICAs (Intensive Conservation Areas) and did not break up 
the ‘fabric’ of the white farming community.   Dr Ndimande, Secretary for Agriculture, 
mentioned to the CFU that he did not simply want reproductions of the resettlement areas or a 
perpetuation of the “them and us” attitude, or a continuation of the dualist farming structure.  He 
wanted the “integration of competent black farmers”.
152  Thus even when identified farms met 
the criteria of the Kangai principles, another set of undefined ‘political’ criteria came into play, 
which seemingly nullified both the block designation and selective identification processes that 
were supposed to run concurrently.  Swire Thompson expressed his frustration; “whatever way 
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you turned - it was the wrong way”.
153   In contrast, Moyo’s (1994: 8) reading of farmer protests 
identified racial arrogance as a key factor: 
 
White farmers believe that they, not the state, should decide on land designation… 
(but)such decision making powers in designating land undermines the legitimacy of the 
elected government in adjudicating the land problem… Most interestingly it 
demonstrates an arrogance that only makes sense in racial parlance. 
 
Controversial designations, detailed in Selby (2006: Appendix IV), revealed the manner in which 
pressure was applied from above and below, and the often-conflicting agendas between local 
party officials, central government and technical departments.  There is evidence to suggest that 
this frustrated some of the technocrats. During a meeting with the CFU, Kangai apparently 
seemed “visibly annoyed” with political interference, and articulated this in an interview with 
The Farmer: 
  
land designation should be a technical matter and not up to politicians… if the 
politicians are going into the field and say that one should be designated and another 
should not…it will destroy the agriculture industry. 
154 
 
The PLIC process was unsuccessful.  It was based on vague and often contradictory sets of 
criteria, and even when mutually acceptable properties were identified, it was frustrated by 
political interferences. It reflected differing interests between ZANU PF and government 
technocrats, and conflicts between local and national interests within these institutions.  Final 
designation lists often differed from those produced by the PLICs.  Highly productive farms 
were designated throughout the exercise, often next door to derelict land.
155   By the end of 1993, 
of the 97 properties designated, 40 had been revoked, seven were mutually agreed, and 46 were 
pending determination by the Minister.  Four farmers were prepared to contest the issue in 
court.
156   Hasluck noted “extreme concern that the land identification committees had failed to 
identify properties as mutually suitable … and (took) a serious view of the matter as it was 
incumbent of CFU to do something about it.”  However farmer scepticism compounded with the 
revelations about the allocation of state acquired land to senior officials. 
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Concerns about land allocations dated back to the reforms of the early 1980s.  Moyo and Skalnes 
(1990) had previously warned of the use of corrupt practices in the land allocation of 
resettlement land. CFU provincial reports record that members’ properties being leased from the 
state were being visited by retired police and army personnel in 1993.
157   When controversy 
erupted over land allocations early in 1994, it was at the height of the mutual frustrations of the 
land identification process. Batha Farm in Wedza, which was acquired in April 1993 for the 
resettlement of 33 families, had instead been allocated to ex-Agriculture Minister Mangwende.
158  
When the news broke, Mugabe publicly revoked all state leases, although in practice nothing 
happened, and the credibility of government’s reform program plummeted.  It was an issue that 
drew overseas attention, and attracted criticism from the press, particularly in the wake of the 
1992 LAA.
159  Although the extent of the problem was quite small, the principle was large, and 
had significant political repercussions.  On 11 May, Sydney Malunga, an outspoken ex-ZAPU 
MP, moved a motion in parliament for full disclosure of all state land lease allocations.
160  Most 
had been allocated to civil servants or high-ranking members of the security forces. The 
allocations of farms to party officials and influential supporters in the 1993 designations,
161 and 
the 1994 ‘Tenant Farm Scandal’
162 were, according to Raftopolous and Moyo (1995: 26), a 
poorly disguised attempt to create a black landed class, who would support the government.  For 
ordinary observers it amounted to hypocrisy from a government that always insisted on 
monopolising the moral aspects of the land issue 
 
1.4.6  Farmer Scepticism and the Communication Breakdown  
 
The breakdown of communications between the commercial farmers and the state was both a 
cause and symptom of deteriorating land negotiations.  Farmer strategies were seen as underhand 
and unpatriotic and at the very least reactive.   Farmers increasingly saw government as corrupt, 
incompetent and insincere.  International concerns and negative-publicity were attributed to 
organized farmer lobbying, rather than to inherent flaws or inconsistencies in the program.  
Moyo (1994:7-8 and 16) saw the attitudes of white farmers as a problem: 
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There has been little proactive action by white landowners and their representative CFU 
to promote lasting reconciliation through reasonable offers of land … claims by farmers’ 
representatives that they agree with the principle of land redistribution are not backed by 
concrete land offers, hence a poor negotiation climate for the land question… it appears 
that the political problem facing Zimbabwe is the absence of good faith on the part of the 
[white farmers] in negotiating and redressing the land question. 
 
Farmers strategies were shaped by a growing mistrust of government and ruling party motives.   
After the 1989 Party conference the CFU realized that they were being distanced from decision-
making, fuelling their concerns about the motives of the LAA, which prompted their calls for a 
representative land board to be appointed.   CFU minutes following the Emergency meeting in 
1991 noted that the land issue was their “biggest and most serious problem since the war”.
163  
The CFU proposal stated that “the most important single issue facing Zimbabweans of the future 
is how the land question is managed today”.
164    
 
In the 1980s, most farming leaders had been impressed, if somewhat surprised, with the calibre 
and pragmatism of leadership within government.  The post-1990 CFU leaders were more 
suspicious and critical.   The relative stability and prosperity of the 1980s, compared to the 
economic instability, growing racial tensions and direct contest for the same resources in the 
1990s obviously strained relations, but there was a difference in farmer strategies. Norman, 
Sinclair and Laurie had used quiet diplomacy and negotiation.  The CFU administrations of the 
1990s were more aggressive and more public. Immediately after the 1992 LAA, Alan Burl stated 
that “this bill violates, the provisions of the constitution, of the CHOGM declaration of human 
rights… the impact on the economy, foreign investment and structural adjustment is 
significant.”
165 Hasluck cautioned that: “the issue must be fought with logic - not emotion!”.
166   
However, he had expressed his own doubts to the New National Land Policy in 1990:  
 
Against this background, what should farmers be doing in the 1990s?… On the face of it, 
quit now, while the going is good … get paid something for the farm before government 
cannot afford to pay anything (Alexander, 1991: 606).
167 
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Shortly after the 1991 meeting, he presented an internal memo entitled ‘Ten Commandments for 
Development in the 1990s’ – a satirical set of criticisms against government, perhaps revealing 
an element of the arrogance to which Moyo (1994: 8) alludes.
168   In the latter half of 1991, the 
CFU public relations officer, Mr Foot, acknowledged “the union’s move away from a traditional 
non-confrontational approach over the last year” and claimed that the more aggressive stance had 
done no harm.
169  In April 1993, Hasluck implied that farmers should re-enter the political arena: 
 
farmers individually and collectively must recognize the importance of maintaining 
standards of governance, as if this was usurped the chaos that we see in many 
neighbouring countries would prevail…[the CFU must consider] taking a more 
aggressive stance in influencing government than it [does] now.
170 
 
Where did the ‘apoliticism’ of the CFU sit in all this?   Hasluck was not in favour of direct 
involvement in opposition politics, or of the new FORUM Party becoming embroiled in the land 
issue and his stance was “supported by many councillors, who agreed that CFU should remain 
low profile and separate from the FORUM Party”.
171     
 
The politics of uncertainty elicited inconsistent responses, but scepticism among CFU officials 
over government intentions and capabilities became more consistent.  CFU Makonde branch 
noted that “Mr Swanepoel reported on a meeting held in his area with Vice President Muzenda.  
He said that he was horrified at the lack of information the Vice-president had regarding the 
basic workings of commercial agriculture”.
172  Notions of superiority and arrogance had waned 
in the 1980s, but re-emerged with increasing corruption, poor governance and official anti-white 
sentiments.   Farmer scepticism illustrated one side of a two-way breakdown of communications 
within the farmer state alliance. Farmer reactions were interpreted by ZANU PF as resistant and 
confrontational.  The process fed itself, as communications deteriorated and positions polarised.   
Structural changes in the sector created further tensions between the CFU and Government after 
commercial farmers were accused of neglecting food production and holding the nation to 
ransom during the 1992 drought.  Mr Ncube MP had commented:  
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the commercial farmers union … do not know that there is independence in Zimbabwe… 
they think that they can say and do anything, (even) sabotage the economy…there is a 
shortage of maize because the people who were supposed to be growing maize abandoned 
that and have chosen tobacco because they believe that there is more money in it.
173 
 
In April 1992, Vice-President Muzenda requested early maize deliveries by commercial farmers 
as the communal crop had failed. He explained that between thirty and fifty thousand tons was 
needed within three weeks. Burl suggested that an incentive price of $1500 /tonne for the 
relevant amount, on a first-come first-served basis, would ensure timely delivery. After 
discussions with Minister Mangwende, Muzenda returned, arguing that $1500/t was too much 
and offered $1000/t.  Burl doubted that $1000/t would be enough, explaining that farmers needed 
maize for their staff, and livestock (given the lack of grazing) and that the market price was 
likely to rise. Although the official price was still $550/ton, the parallel market price had reached 
$1000/ton. Within days, Mugabe vilified commercial farmers: headlines in The Herald read 
“Farmers Demand $1500 Or They Will Not Deliver”.
174 Burl argues that the market would have 
been the quickest way of meeting emergency demand.
175  Burl noted that state media made no 
mention of the CFU’s joint-initiative with USAID to set up a famine early warning system, nor 
did they mention that Burl had facilitated the transport of maize to drought-stricken communal 
areas two months previously.
176  John Meikle suggested that it was unhelpful to get involved in 
maize politics, but the issue was more fundamental: commercial farmers were increasingly 
convenient scapegoats.  CFU officials were on the back-foot.  Swire-Thompson observed:  
 
It was difficult to know what to do… elements of the ruling party had no intention of 
considering our opinions, or listening to our suggestions … lobbying other stakeholders 
was an obvious strategy.  We felt that the more people that were informed the better.
177 
 
Farmers were exercising a ‘voice’ option.  Under pressure and feeling threatened they attempted 
to apply the brakes within the existing institutional arrangement, within which the international 
community and donors were seen as arbitrators.   Early in 1993 Antony Swire-Thompson sent a 
letter of qualified support to the Paris Donors Conference. The letter emphasised the impact of 
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the drought and the potential implications of a large-scale land reform in its wake. It provoked a 
furious reaction from a normally amicable John Nkomo.
178   There were critical articles in The 
Herald, The Chronicle and in Parade magazine.
179    Two issues incensed ZANU PF: firstly, the 
perceived spoiler tactics and, secondly, the independent lobbying of the CFU.
180   Parade 
magazine published the CFU’s rebuttal but Mugabe refused to meet Swire-Thompson for 
months, in much the same way as he had shunned Laurie after the 1985 elections.
 181  The CFU 
eventually asked Denis Norman to engineer a meeting, but communications remained strained.
182   
 
Moyo (1994:4) argues that Mugabe sought to find a means of conciliation: “President Mugabe’s 
speeches since [1990] have emphasised the important role that land can play in reconciling 
blacks and whites”.  If this was Mugabe’s public face, a different story emerged in other forums.  
Opening a central committee meeting, in September 1993, Mugabe declared: 
 
Government will not surrender the people’s right to a greedy bunch of racist usurpers…these 
racist Rhodesians, sponsor the FORUM party and treat their workers worse than their dogs … 
(these) farmers are either the direct descendents or inheritors or successors of the land and 
power grabbers of 1890.
183 
 
This was the start of a campaign to discredit commercial farmers.  It differed from the sporadic 
election oriented outbursts of the 1980s and became increasingly sustained.  It was used to 
specifically portray and suggest the illegitimacy of farmers’ involvement in ‘opposition’ politics.  
In April of 1994, a formal meeting was arranged with the Agricultural Editor of The Herald 
newspaper, to try to put an end to reports that opposition to land redistribution had been led by 
‘disgruntled white farmers”.
184  Yet it was this stereotype of the white farmer – arrogant, selfish, 
resistant to change, disgruntled, unpatriotic and confrontational, that began to shape and unite the 
spectrum of frustrated stances within the ruling party. 
1.5  CONCLUSION 
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1990 was an important watershed for several reasons: the expiry of the Lancaster House 
Constitution, the implementation of structural adjustment, the return of land to the forefront of 
national discourse and the formal recognition of support for black economic empowerment. A 
wider array of interest groups engaged in a wider array of land uses, which fuelled a more 
complex set of land demands and pressures. Urban and international capital flowed into 
horticulture and wildlife, while long-standing demands for land in communal areas were joined 
by demands from aspiring black commercial farmers, now legitimised by the market ideologies 
of ESAP.  In the 1980s land policy and agricultural policies had not contradicted each other.  In 
the 1990s they did, heralding a new, more unpredictable and threatening era for white farmers. 
 
The changes reflected and encouraged a reconfiguration of the state.  Decision-making was 
increasingly confined by disagreements between the inner circles of the ruling party and 
government technocrats and moderates.   The 1992 Land Acquisition Act attempted to transfer 
‘control’ of property rights from the judiciary to the executive, and the ruling party sought to 
increase its control of the land question and the valuable political capital around it.   Multiple, 
overlapping and often contradictory land policies emerged, in an attempt to cater for all interests, 
but really delivering to none.    Compulsory land acquisition was incongruent with structural 
adjustment, particularly whilst an active land market operated.  Structural adjustment and the 
democratisation process demanded a rolling back of the state, but in Zimbabwe this was partial 
and selective.  Expenditure cuts were restricted to key sectors such as health and education and 
land resettlement, whilst spending on defence and government salaries increased.  The 1992 
drought impacted heavily on the economy, pressures for land and the vulnerability of the state.     
 
The profile of the commercial farming sector evolved considerably during this period, primarily 
due to structural adjustment.  The expansion and diversification into export-oriented land uses 
such as horticulture, tourism and wildlife management, altered systems of land use across the 
country and brought previously marginal land into the main stream economy.   Vertical 
integration and the processing of agricultural products also changed the structure of the industry.  
These structural changes and the influx of urban and international investment into agriculture 
increased the diversity and differentiation of the sector.  The intensification of land use should 
have made commercial agriculture more conducive to reforms and adaptations, through 
subdivisions and land taxes, underlining the significance of these lost opportunities.  
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Communications between white farmers and the state deteriorated significantly and any trust that 
had developed during the 1980s was lost.  Decreasing consultation with the CFU during the 
drafting of the LAA, political interferences in land identification, and controversial land 
allocations fuelled doubts across the farming community.  Among government officials, CFU 
strategies were seen as confrontational, and at best defensive. The state blamed the farmers and 
the farmers blamed the state as racial mistrust re-emerged amidst the new uncertainties.   The 
CFU representatives dealt with amicable front men for most of the post-independence era, 
without paying enough attention to background signals from the politburo or from local party 
and government, particularly over land identifications.
185 There was a tendency by farmers to 
listen to signals that they wanted to hear, and ignore those they did not. Illusions of 
indispensability, scepticism over government’s ability to proceed with reform, and a focus on the 
opportunities of ESAP all contributed to a collective myopia.  Demands for land had not 
subsided though, and were increasingly tied with the interrelated struggles for political terrain 
and economic terrain, illustrated through aggressive black economic-nationalist aspirations 
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